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The informal sector is generally believed to be more 
vulnerable to various risks due to limited access to 
social insurance, but little empirical evidence exists 
to support this statement. This paper examines the 
relationship between informality and protection from 
health risks in Yemen. The formal sector, when defined 
based on pension coverage, largely overlaps with 
public employment where the better educated, more 
experienced, and better informed tend to work. The 
results indicate that, even after accounting for socio-
economic status, water supply and quality conditions, 
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risky behavior patterns, and unobserved heterogeneity, 
formal sector households have better accessibility and 
affordability to health service. This may in part explain 
better health outcomes among formal households, 
although large heterogeneity across regions (urban/
rural) exists. However, the role of the existing health 
insurance is found to be unclear. The findings reconfirm 
the importance of policies that promote universal access 
to health service and a risk pooling avenue delinked from 
employment types as well as healthy living conditions 
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1.  Introduction 
Informal sector workers are arguably believed to be less protected from various risks than their formal 
sector counterparts for several reasons.
2 This is primarily because the informal sector largely overlaps 
with low quality jobs where the workers, often less educated and low skilled, tend to work with little 
legal or social protection linked to their work status such as social insurance.
3 In addition, informality 
may have implications on the ability to hedge risks due to limited self-insurance and self-protection. 
Informal sector workers, more likely to live in poverty and face liquidity constraints, have few options 
on the choice of inter-temporal savings and dissavings for self-insurance. They may be less risk averse 
and  more  likely  to  engage  in  risky  behavior  with  little  self -protection, as  they  perceive  their 
opportunity costs little due to low earnings potential.       
Little evidence exists, however, whether and to what extent informal sector is more vulnerable 
than formal sector. An increasing number of studies emphasize  that informality does not necessarily 
imply the vulnerability of workers. Some highly productive and well informed workers often choose 
to work in the informal sector.
4 Seemingly larger exposure to risks for some less educated, less skilled 
workers in the informal sector, who are more likely to live in poverty, may not be necessarily due to 
informality. Moreover, informal sector workers may have better access to informal safety nets through 
family and community members they work with. Therefore, the vulnerability of the informal sector is 
theoretically and empirically unclear. 
Thus what  measures  are  needed  to  provide  the  informal sector with  adequate protection, 
without disfavoring formal sector  and  creating distortive incentives,  is  subject to debate.  This is 
                                                 
2 These risks include job loss (e.g., sudden layoff, bad weather for crops, or economic crisis), health shocks (e.g., 
accident or disease), longevity (e.g., outliving accumulated wealth) and the resulting income losses. 
3 This includes supplementary income provision in response to job losses  (e.g., unemployment insurance), health 
shocks (e.g., health insurance) and consequent human capital loss (e.g., disability benefits), and old-age poverty (e.g., 
pension). 
4 See, for example, Maloney (2004), Perry et al. (2007) and Schneider and Enste (2000). 3 
 
particularly true when social insurance programs, even for formal sector workers, do not properly 
function or provide adequate protection. Self-insurance may be equally difficult regardless of the 
sector due to credit constraints and myopia. If family members’ vulnerability to risks in the informal 
sector stems from limited access to social insurance, protection, or information, measures need to be 
taken to delink social insurance and relevant information from the work sector and expand insurance 
coverage and accessibility. However, if informal sector is no more vulnerable than formal sector due 
to other informal safety net, the welfare gain from expanding social insurance may be small.  
This  paper  investigates  the  informal  households’  vulnerability  using  Yemen’s  Household 
Budget  Survey  focusing  on  health.
5  Health  is  a  critical  determinant  of  household  well -being, 
especially in low income countries like Yemen where labor and human capital is usually the main 
source of income.
6 Using a unique data set that includes information on labor market activities and 
health variables, this paper investigates whether Yeminis’ health, access to care, and burden of health 
spending  systematically  differ  by  employment  sector, and if  so,  the  underlying  reasons  for  these 
differences. This paper contributes to a better understanding of informality and its implications on 
household welfare in health in Yemen.  
Informality in this study is defined based on access to social insurance.
7 Wage employed 
workers provided with pension   or health insurance or both   are formal, whereas  workers without 
access to social insurance coverage are informal. Among the formal wage employed, those with both 
health and pension coverage are separately categorized with those with pension coverage only, as the 
role of health insurance in health outcom es is  also of interest. Informal workers include the wage 
                                                 
5 Ideally, in order to investigated households’ vulnerability to external shock, one needs panel data to track the same 
individuals or households, showing how their consumption, investment in health and education, or their labor market 
behavior change in response to the shock. The analysis sets aside these important dimensions of household welfare 
due to data availability. This area would be a subject for future research.  
6 Note that Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Middle East and North Afr ica Region with about 1,000 
dollars GNI(Gross National Income) per capita. 
7 This is in line with many other studies that defined informality based on protection through social security. See 
Portes, Blitzner, and Curtis (1986), Marcoullier et al. (1997), and Saavedra and Chong (1999).  4 
 
employed  and  the  self-employed  with  no  access  to  any  social  insurance.  In  order  to  consider 
unobserved characteristics that affect employment type, a selection corrected model is estimated.  
The findings are as follows: in general, formal households have better outcomes in health than 
the informal households, although there is large heterogeneity especially between urban and rural 
areas. The better outcomes among formal households may be related to the better and affordable 
access to health service, especially among those with health insurance. The differences in outcomes, 
though in large part due to their different observable characteristics, persist even for observationally 
identical individuals. Health and nutrition outcomes confirm the importance of good water conditions 
and healthy practice of breastfeeding and abstaining from smoking and qat chewing. The role of 
existing health insurance is not clear, although it may have increased access and utilization of health 
service.  Households rely largely on informal safety net to cope with health burden due to disability of 
household member. These findings suggest that policies should primarily  aim to promote healthy 
living  conditions  and  lifestyle,  and  provide  risk  pooling  and  saving  avenue  regardless  of  their 
employment type.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of concepts and issues related 
to informality. Section 3 describes the data and institutional background regarding health protection in 
Yemen.  Section  4  and  5  presents  a  descriptive  analysis  and  the  empirical  strategy,  respectively. 
Section 6 discusses the results on implications of informality on health outcomes. Section 7 and 8 
further investigate potential explanations regarding the results presented in Section 6. Finally, section 
9 summarizes and concludes the study. 
2.  Informality and Health Shocks 
A large body of literature on informality often has examined its definition, size, and determinants and 
consequences, but suggested no conclusive views. Little consensus exists, and informality is often 
characterized as mixture of lax regulation, an absence of records and taxation, and a large presence of 5 
 
unprotected,  low-skilled  workers.
8  Studies often take an either side of enterprises or workers to 
examine the implications of informality.  From the enterprises’ perspective, studies highlight various 
incentives to enter the informal sector, including excessive tax rates, a high degree of regulation, and 
social insurance contribution, and examine the impacts of these on firms’ productivity.  More relevant 
for  this  paper,  studies  examining  informality  from  workers’  perspective  often  emphasize  their 
productivity and protection gap.
9 
Informal  sector  workers  or  enterprises,  h owever,  are  not  monolithic,  but  in  fact,  a 
heterogeneous group exhibiting a wide range of  variation. They are in general characterized as less 
educated, less skilled, and from low income families,  who  often have  no choice but to work in 
informal sector and tend to have low earnings.
10 Several studies, however, challenge the notion that 
informal employment only entails low quality jobs where workers with no other employment options 
are forced to participate in. Marcoullier et al. (1997), for example, examine the wage premium of the 
formal over informal sector in Mexico, El Salvador, and Peru. Informal workers are defined based on 
the enterprise size or social security coverage. They found  a positive wage premium for work in the 
formal sector in El Salvador and Peru, but not in Mexico.  Maloney (2004) and Perry et al. (2010) in 
particular emphasize the voluntary exit of workers from the formal sector to take advantage of lower 
business costs as well as  an exclusion aspect. Bosch and Maloney (2008) also find  a heterogeneous 
                                                 
8 In addition to the mentioned dimension of informality, there are studies that treated informality as hidden or illegal 
economies. For example, see Frey, Weck, and Pommerehne (1982), Cassel and Cichy (1986), and Schneider and 
Enste (2000) for informality as a hidden economic activities; Friedman et al. (2000) as unofficial activity; Pyle (1989) 
and Thomas (1999) as illegal economy. Depending on the scope of coverage, the size of informality varies widely. 
See Tanzi, (1999), Thomas (1999), and Giles (1999) for discussion on the size of informal sector. 
9 The definition of informality adopted from the International Labor Organization (ILO) is as follows. The informal 
sector is broadly characterised as consisting of units engaged in the production of goods or services with the primary 
objective of generating employment and incomes to the persons concerned. These units typically operate at a low 
level of organisation, with little or no division between labour and capital as factors  of production and on a small 
scale. Labour relations - where they exist - are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and social 
relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees. 
10 Many studies examined characteristics of formal and informal sector workers in countries in the Latin America and 
Caribbean region, but few studies are available for the characteristics of informality in the Middle East and North 
Africa region. For example, Funkhouser (1999) for 5 Central Amer ican countries, Bargain and Kwenda (2010) for 
Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa, and Gindling (1991) in Costa Rica, Marcoullier et al. (1997) for Mexico, El 
Salvador, and Peru. 6 
 
nature of the informal sector where some self-employed enter the market during economic expansion 
while displaced workers would rather work in the informal sector than stay unemployed during the 
economic downturns. 
There is little definite evidence as to whether informal workers are less protected from poverty 
induced by external shocks. It is widely accepted though that informal sector likely has limited access 
to risk pooling and savings vehicles, and is less protected from income loss induced by shocks. Most 
social insurances such as pension, unemployment benefits, and health insurance are only provided to 
formal sector employees. Not having access to social insurance reduces risk pooling and savings 
options to insure against risks (Gertler and Gruber, 2002). However, the causal relationship between 
informal  sector  employment  and  vulnerability  is  unclear.  Extra  income  accumulated  from  non-
payment of taxes, and the use of informal safety nets present in the informal economy may reduce 
vulnerability of informal sector.
11 Some studies  have  found that  the informal sector serves as  an 
informal safety net for the poor (Ferman, Henry and Hoyman, 1987) . The informal sector also  
provides employment opportunities for workers in transit and marginalized workers  such as women 
(Carneiro et al. 2008).  Gulyani and Talukdar (2010) found that informal activities, including micro 
enterprises, actually helped alleviate poverty. 
Little is known about the implications of informality or lack of health insurance on health. If 
health is produced with individuals’ decision of investment in preventive and curative health services, 
as in Grossman (1972), limited access to service would result in poor health. Given that health risks 
are least predictable and quite sizeable, the lack of insurance to hedge against the risks would limit 
adequate  investment  in  health.  Findings  that  the  poor  are  less  well-insured  against  income  risks 
suggest  that  informal  households  are  also  less-well insured as  they  tend to  be  poorer  (Jalan and 
Ravallion, 1996). Baeza and Packard (2006) note that large scale risk pooling can greatly mitigate the 
                                                 
11  See Richard J. Cebula (1997), for the impact of the income tax rates on labor supply across formal and informal 
sector. 7 
 
risk of income losses due to health shocks. However, health insurance often fails to cover informal 
sector and, even among formal sector, the coverage can be very low due to low enrollment (Wagstaff, 
2009). Thus little is known about the extent to which health insurance reduces vulnerability to the 
health shocks. 
3.  Data and Institutional Background 
 
Data 
This study uses a nationally representative Yemen Household Budget Survey (HBS) conducted in 
2006. In examining health risks by work status, the data should contain information on both health 
and labor market outcomes. The wealth of information on health as well as individual demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics, labor market indicators, and household living conditions, income, 
and expenditure enable to analyze the health implications of informality.
12   
The Yemen HBS collected information on 13,121 households and 98,845 individuals. Among 
56,600 adults aged fifteen or above, 20,888 individuals are working as either wage employed or self-
employed.
13 For all workers, the data contain information on job duration for the current occupation, 
the total number of jobs held, and an indicator of agriculture sector. In addition to this, wage workers 
are asked about social insurance coverage, benefits such as paid leaves, and earnings and working 
hours are included. For the self -employed,  the  information on the  size of enterprises and rough 
measures of revenue and costs are collected. 
                                                 
12 A Labor Force Survey includes detailed information on labor market indicators including employment status and 
sector, job search efforts, and earnings, but often lacks information on health. On the other hand, Demographic 
Health Survey has detailed information on health, but misses labor market indicators. 
13  Among those not working, it is unclear whether they are still in the job search process.  Thus, defining an 
economically active population using a standard definition is not possible here. The majority of non -working adults 
are either women or students. 8 
 
The data contain nutrition and health information for children under six, health and service use 
information for adults, and health spending for households. Children’s nutrition measures, such as 
underweight and stunting, are constructed  using objective measures of weight and height. Health 
measures  include  self-reported  disability  and  chronic  diseases,  illness,  and  accidents.  Health  care 
service information includes each child’s immunization, assisted child delivery, and regular health 
checkups with health professionals.
14 
   
Health and Health Care in Yemen 
The most serious  health  problem  faced by Yemenis  is  women  and  children’s  health,  where  the 
achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) proves challenging. Child malnutrition is 
strikingly prevalent in Yemen where more than half of children under five suffer from malnutrition.
15 
This is among the world’s highest child malnutrition rate along with Iraq and Sudan. Progress towards 
reducing the child malnutrition rate by half has been slow. The maternal mortality rate, 365 deaths per 
100,000 lives, is the highest among the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region countries.
16 
While health indicators in Yemen pose a serious problem, access to health services are low, 
and services for major treatments are prohibitively expensive. The government, Ministry of Public 
Health and Population (MOPHP), is the main health service provider in Yemen. They operate a three-
tier network of primary, secondary, and tertiary level facilities through governorate and district health 
offices. One of the   major  challenges  of  the  Yemeni  health system  is  low coverage  among  the 
population. Furthermore, large discrepancies exist in levels of coverage between urban and rural areas 
(Fairbank, 2009). Due to the l imited delivery of  health services, particularly in rural areas where 
                                                 
14 World Bank (2007) noted that the questionnaire of HBS 2005 did not clearly distinguish if the question meant to 
ask about delivery by a doctor, midwife or a medically trained professional. 
15 See UNICEF (2006). 
16 See World Bank (2009). 9 
 
approximately three-fourths of the population are concentrated, Yeminis face challenges in achieving 
maternal and child health related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
17 
In addition to the lack of health service delivery, an underinstitutionalized financial payment 
system presents another barrier to health care in Yemen. Since there is no existing health insurance 
scheme in Yemen, health expenditures mostly come from out-of-pocket payment. While public health 
spending from MOPHP provided service comprises 1.8% of GDP, private out -of-pocket expenditure 
is about two times larger at 3.4% of GDP (Fairbank, 2009).  Only a slight proportion of  government 
workers  receive  reimbursement  for  utilized  health  service s.    Even  out-of-pocket  expenditures, 
however, are a concern to those who have access to health service s. Since a large proportion of  the 
population has limited access to service, the out -of-pocket expenditure generally occurs only to the 
well-off or the severely ill.  Households with disabled or chronically ill members are exposed to large 
losses in income, but there is no risk pooling instrument available in Yemen. 
 
4.  Descriptive Analysis 
 
Health  outcomes  may  vary  across  individuals  due  to  differences  in  (i)  resources  available  for 
investment in health; (ii) living conditions including water and sanitation environment; (iii) risky 
behavioral  patterns;  and  (iv)  unobserved  preferences  or  information.  In  order  to  capture  these 
differences, the characteristics of formal and informal workers and households by employment status 




                                                 
17 For example, MDGs 4 and 5 are not likely to be met in Yemen. MDG 4: Reducing child mortality and morbidity 
and MDG 5: Improving maternal health. 10 
 
Characteristics of Workers, Jobs, and Households by Employment Type 
Recall that among all employed workers, those who are wage employed and provided with a pension 
are categorized  as formal workers; other wage workers and the self-employed are categorized as 
informal workers (See Figure 1). That is health insured workers (H) and pension only workers (P) 
compose  formal  sector  workers,  while  wage  workers  without  social  insurance  (N)  and  the  self 
employed (S) compose informal sector workers. Among formal workers, a small fraction reported 
employer  provided  health  insurance,  although  no  other  information  such  as  their  contribution, 
coverage, and reimbursement from insurance is available.  
Table  1  reports  workers,  jobs,  and  households’  characteristics  by  employment  type  and 
locality of residence. The first row of the table shows the distribution of each type of workers. About 
25  percent  of  working  individuals  are  formal,  among  whom  28  percent  are  covered  by  health 
insurance.  The share of formal sector is higher in urban than rural areas: about a half of formal 
workers reside in urban areas, whereas slightly more than 20 percent of informal workers reside in 
urban areas.  
   
Figure 1. Category of workers: 
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There are clear differences in demographic characteristics across different types of workers 
(Panel A of table 1). Several of these differences are more striking in urban than rural areas. The 
majority  of  workers,  especially  informal  and  rural  ones,  is  male,  reflecting  a  very  limited  work 
opportunities for Yemeni women. The self employed tend to be older than other groups, whereas the 
informal wage workers are the youngest. Formal workers are significantly more educated with more 
than half having received tertiary education. On the other hand, self-employed workers are the least 
educated group; about half (51%) have no schooling.
18 Educational attainment is a lot higher in urban 
areas, and the urban/rural educational gap is particularly larger for informal wage workers. Self -
employed workers tend to have larger families with more children, partly because they are older. The 
indicator of “born here” informing the mobility of labor shows that the labor in rural areas is static 
with little move. Urban areas relative to rural witnesses more labor mobility: the self-employed are 
most likely to be born in the current village, while the health insured formal workers are the least 
likely group. 
Panel B reports job characteristics of these workers. Informal workers include a large share of 
agriculture,  particularly  among  the  self  employed  and  rural  workers,  whereas  only  a  negligible 
proportion of workers in formal sector work in agriculture. Formal sector largely overlaps with public 
sector: the proportion of public workers among formal workers is 97 percent, and the proportion of 
formal workers among public workers is 89 percent.   When the number of jobs was inquired, a 
substantial proportion of workers, especially wage workers, hold more than one job, and this is more 
evident in rural areas.
19  
                                                 
18 Social network is very important in seeking job opportunities. About one third of respondents answered that they 
find about jobs through friends and relatives, and about a quarter directly ask employers. Only a small portion of 
people seek jobs through an official channel such as labor office. More educated people may have more information 
on formal sector jobs through this social network. 
19 It is well known that formal or public sector workers often have side jobs other than their main occupation, as their 
salary is lower than private sector. 12 
 
There exist noticeable differences in earnings and hours of work as well as benefits among the 
wage employed.  Informal wage employees N, mostly in the private sector, have little access to the 
benefits like paid leaves or health insurance and work longer hours, although their earnings are higher 
or comparable to the formal sector workers.
20 Workers of P have lower earnings with shorter hours of 
work, even though their education and work experience are comparable relative to their counterparts 
with health insurance. The gap in hours and earnings across different types is slightly larger in urban 
areas than the rural.  
Some households’ characteristics including their living conditions and income are presented 
(Panel C in table 1). The indicator of pensioner in the household shows a positive intergenerational 
correlation in formal sector working, as current formal worker households are more likely to have 
pensioners  in  the  household.  Living  conditions  measured  by  water  supply  and  quality  reveals 
substantial variation across types and between areas. A subjective measure of enough water supply 
indicates  no  systematic  disparity  between  formal  and  informal  households,  as  type  H  and  P 
households offset each other for the average to be similar to that of the informal households. To the 
contrary, more objective measures indicating inside water supply and water treatment suggests that 
there is a significant gap in access and quality of water between formal and informal households, 
especially in urban areas. It is also striking that rural areas are significantly behind in water supply and 
quality than urban areas.  
About 65 percent of workers reported that their households have extra income other than his 
labor earnings, including public and private transfers and interest income. The amount of extra income 
is highest for the S, followed by P, and least for the N and H.
21 When income quintile is obtained 
based on nonfood consumption level, which supposedly reflects total household income including 
                                                 
20 Their monthly earnings were calculated based solely on their main occupations. Other labor earnings from non 
main jobs were not included here. The earnings information among the self employed were not very clear in their 
revenue, profits, and costs of enterprises, and omitted here. 
21 It is not very clear from the data whether the extra income includes labor earnings from non-main occupations. 13 
 
labor  earnings  and  other  transfers,  a  large  urban/rural  and  formal/informal  income  discrepancies 
emerge: less than six percent of urban formal sector belongs to the lowest quintiles in contrast with the 
20 percent of rural counterparts; in both urban and rural, formal workers are better off in income 
distribution than the informal workers; rural formal workers are more likely to fall on lower end of 
income distribution than the urban informal. 
 
Health Outcomes, Access, and Expenditure 
Having  examined  individuals  and  households’  characteristics  by  employment  type  and  locality,  I 
move over to the health dimensions focusing on health indicators, access to service, and expenditure 
(See table 2). Health outcomes examined here include indicators of malnutrition for children and 
illness for adults.
22 Access to health service is measured with indicators  of assisted delivery, medical 
help when sick, and child immunization. Financial burden due to health spending is measured as per 
capita health expenditure,  indicators of catastrophic expenditure, and proportion of health spending 
out of total expenditure.
23  
  Child health and nutrition outcomes reconfirm the serious situation in Yemen.  A significant 
proportion of children are severely stunted, and the incidence of underweight and illness is also high. 
Nutrition outcomes are slightly better for children in  formal sector households and the difference is 
clearer for urban children.   Nutrition outcomes  do not necessarily go with the health outcomes: 
Nutrition status is better among urban children, while health outcome s are better for rural children. 
The outcomes of formal households with health insurance are no better or often worse than those of 
                                                 
22 Children’s malnutrition is captured by severe stunting and underweight for those below age six. Illness is defined to 
be one if the person has disability or chronic disease, nonchronic diseases, or accidents. 
23  Catastrophic  expenditure  is  defined  to  be one  when  the  proportion  of  health  expenditure  out  of  nonfood 
consumption exceeds 10 and 20 percent. Caution is neede d to normatively interpret the indicator of catastrophic 
expenditure. It is certainly burdensome to have a large proportion of income spent on health, but it is also important 
to have adequate investment in human capital. 14 
 
formal  households  without  health  insurance.  Almost  one  woman  out  of  five  has  some  disability, 
illness or accidents in urban areas. Women’s illness is less prevalent in rural areas.  
Health care service is best accessible by both types of formal households, with slightly better 
outcomes for H than P in some cases, and the self-employed (S) have similar or slightly better access 
than informal wage employed workers. Access to care widely varies across urban and rural region, 
particularly  in  assisted  delivery.  The  likelihood  of  receiving  medical  help  when  falling  ill  is 
surprisingly  high.  Child  immunization  indicates  immunization  for  all  of  listed  diseases  including 
tuberculosis, polio, DTP, measles, and hepatitis-B, and the proportion of children who received all 
varies from 37 percent among rural informal wage worker families to 60 percent in urban formal 
households. 
Per  capita  expenditure  on  health,  probably  reflecting  household  income  level,  is  highest 
among formal and lowest among informal wage employed workers. When it comes to the share of 
health expenditure out of the total household expenditure, the share in informal households seem to be 
slightly higher than that of formal households. The incidence of catastrophic expenditure also shows a 
similar story.  
5.  Selectivity Corrected Model 
There  are  three  potential  explanations  why  health  related  outcomes  are  different  across  different 
employment types. First, workers and their households’ observed characteristics that may affect health 
outcomes,  likely  differ  across  employment  types.  For  example,  child  health  in  formal  sector 
households would be better if more educated parents who tend to have better knowledge for child 
health are concentrated in formal sector. Second, some unobserved characteristics such as preference 
or tendency that affect sector assignment may affect health outcomes. For example, if less risk averse 
parents tend to be self employed, the health outcomes can be different for them. Third, there are 
intrinsic  differences  across  employment  types,  not  captured  by  observable  characteristics  nor 15 
 
unobserved  tendency,  that  may  affect  health  outcomes.  Examples  include  availability  of  social 
insurance, access to knowledge, and social network for informal safety net. 
  In order to address the first two issues, and to draw some implications on the third point, I use 
a selectivity correction model. This approach takes the choice into each different type of employment 
as endogenous and addresses a selection bias. Following suggestions by Lee (1983) and Bourguignon 
(2004), I estimate outcomes with two steps.
24 The first step  is a multinomial logit regression that 
estimates the probability of selection into each employment type. Then the second step is to estimate 
outcomes with self selection corrected term based on the earlier estimated probability of selection. 
 
Multinomial Logit 
A worker is observed to be in one of the four mutually exclusive employment types as shown above: 
wage employment with pension and health insurance ( H), wage employment with pension only (P), 
wage employment without pension or health insurance (N), and self employment (S). Let      denote 
the unobserved propensity for an individual i to hold j type of employment, which is determined by 
worker and market characteristics. The individual is assigned to be in the type which gives the highest 
value for the unobserved propensity. This means that  




                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
  
where    is an actual type of employment that i was assigned. 
                                                 
24 Starting from Heckman (1979), studies have suggested econometric techniques to address selectivity bias. Lee 
(1983) and Dubin and McFadden (1984) provided selectivity bias correction methods, and recently, Bourguignon 
(2004) reviewed all of these approaches using Monte Carlo simulation. This paper uses methodology based on Lee 
(1983) due to its simplicity despite somewhat restrictive assumptions. 16 
 
  Let      be specified as a linear function of observable characteristics (    and unobservable 
random errors following a standard normal distribution conditional on     Then,                    and 
the standard multinomial logit yields  
(2)               
          
              
 with j=H, P, N, and S. 
Using the informal wage employment (N) as a base category, the multinomial logit was estimated. 
Worker’s  characteristics  including  age,  education,  and  marital  status,  and  governorates  dummy 
capturing local characteristics including labor market conditions are added. Subsamples of locality of 
residence and employment status are also considered.    
  Table  3  reports  the  results  from  multinomial  logit  estimation.  As  the  informal  wage 
employment is the base category, the estimates read the relative propensity of working in other types 
of employment rather than informal wage employment. Age, marriage, and education are positively 
associated with formal employment. That is, older and better educated workers are significantly more 
likely to work in formal sector than informal. The effects of some variables are heterogeneous across 
urban and rural areas. In urban areas, secondary education and above is negatively related to self 
employment  rather  than  informal  wage  employment,  and  being  a  household  head  and  having  a 
pensioner in the household are significantly related to formal sector working.  Also, being born at 
current village is negatively related to the informal wage employment, implying that those who lack 
local network may tend to work in informal wage employed jobs. In rural areas, however, those with 
secondary and above education and social network by being born in the same locality tend to work in 
self employment rather than informal wage employment.  
  The coefficients of each estimation, taken together and examined with the likelihood ratio test, 
shows significant differences from zero for both urban and rural areas. This indicates an overall non 
random sector assignment.  In order to examine if sector assignment even within formal, between H 
and P is statistically different across observable characteristics, the null hypothesis that difference in 17 
 
the coefficients of columns (1) and (2) is zero is tested. For urban areas, the Chi Square value is 15.8 
and the null hypothesis is rejected only at 10% level whereas, in rural areas, the Chi Square value is 
26.5 and the null hypothesis is rejected at 1% level. This implies that assignment between each type of 
employment including H and P is also nonrandom, although workers in H and P in urban areas are 
almost identical. 
 
Selectivity Corrected Outcomes 
Let the outcomes (   ) such as wage and health be determined jointly with sector assignment and a 
function of observable characteristics (Z). Then         
         , where j=H, P, N, and S. Taking 
conditional  expectation  over  all  individuals  on  sector  assignment  yields                  
    
             Selectivity into each type of employment implies that                 and the Ordinary 
Least  Squares  (OLS)  estimate  is  not consistent.  Following  Bourguignon  (2004),  Lee  (1983),  and 
Gindling (1991), the selectivity corrected model is estimated as 
(3)          
              , where     
               
         .
25 
In this case, the standard errors should be corrected  in order to factor in  the unobserved selectivity. 
Using a Bootstrapping method with generating         50  times,  the  corrected  standard  errors  are 
obtained. Also note that variables affecting sector selection (X) should include some variables that are 
not included in the second stage characteristics (Z). The variables that affect the first stage selection, 
but not the second stage outcomes, include an indicator of being a household head, having a pensioner 
in the household, and being born in the current village.  
The focus here is then to examine whether outcomes differ by employment types and how 
much is attributable to observable characteristics and selectivity. A series of exercises provide some 
insights  on  this.  In  order  to  examine  the  presence  of  selectivity,  we  first  note  the  statistical 
                                                 
25 Note that   and   denote probability density and cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution. 18 
 
significance  of  selection correction  term  (   .  While  the  likelihood  ratio  test  from  the  first  stage 
multinomial logit regression provides the information on randomness of assignment to each type, the 
statistical significance of selectivity shows whether the assignment to each type affects the outcomes. 
Then comparing coefficients (    of observed characteristics across j would reveal the existence of 
segmentation, where observationally identical individuals may have different outcomes even after 
factoring  in  the  unoberservable  heterogeneity.  A  decomposition  exercise  may  inform  where  the 
difference in predicted values of outcome stems from: intrinsic difference across employment type, 
observable  differences  among  workers,  and  selectivity.  From  equation  (3),  using  Oaxaca 
decomposition and taking differences of mean values of outcomes for P and N, for example, yields: 
(4)                                      
 
                              
       
                                     
(5)                       
 
                              
       




The first term (①) reflects the differences in observable characteristics, the second term (②) captures 
differential  effects  of  the  same  observable  characteristics,  and  the  third  term  (③)  reflects  the 
discrepancy  attributable  to  unobserved  heterogeneity  and  selection.  The  second  and  third  parts 
together  reflect  outcome  differences  not  explained  by  observational  differences.  Averaging  out 
equations (4) and (5) yields an average path for decomposition. Finally, predicted values based on the 
estimation would provide useful information on group disparities. The t test of differences informs 
statistical significance of outcomes. Predicted outcomes at average characteristics also will inform 
how outcomes may vary for observationally identical individuals.  
  To begin with, I examine worker’s wage rate, defined as earnings divided by hours of work, 
using the selectivity corrected model.
27 Table 4 presents the results from wage estimation among the 
                                                 
26 See Oaxaca (1973). 
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wage employed including H, P, and N. Wage rates increase with one’s age and education across all 
types of employment in urban areas, but the returns to additional education level are largest for H and 
smallest for N. A pair-wise comparison shows that the returns to age in rural areas are smaller than in 
urban areas, whereas the returns to education are larger in rural areas than urban areas, probably due 
to the limited supply of skilled workers. The occupation specific skills, measured with the job duration 
at the current work, have significant impacts on wage rates at decreasing rate, although urban P shows 
little  distinctive  patterns  regarding  the  job  duration  and  wages.  The  coefficients  of  selection  are 
significantly different from zero only for urban H although selection into each sector is nonrandom, 
suggesting mild impacts of selection on wage rates. The predicted wage rates of each employment 
type by region (Figure 2) shows significantly higher rates among formal workers relative to informal 
wage employed, especially formal H workers.  
      
Figure 2. Predicted Wage Rates: 
 by employment status and region 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
27 Unfortunately, the earnings information is not available for the self employed, and only the formal and informal 













  The t test indicates that there are significant differences in wage rates between H, P, and N in 
urban areas, whereas the wage rates of  H and P, significantly higher than N, are not statistically 
different from each other in rural areas. Finally, the decomposition exercise confirms that a significant 
proportion  of  the  discrepancy  in  wage  rates  between  groups  is  not  explained  by  observable 
characteristics. For example, the wage rates of H and P in urban areas are higher than N by 0.39 and 
0.26, and the parts due to observed characteristics are 0.47 and 0.18, respectively. Meanwhile, in rural 
areas, the wage rates differences in H and P relative to N is 0.13 and 0.18, and the parts due to 
observed characteristics are 0.32 and 0.30, respectively. This suggests that wage rates among H in 
urban areas, and both H and P in rural areas may be discounted due to some unobserved non wage 
benefits. However, a caution is needed to interpret these results, as the category of informal self 
employed is omitted due to limited information on wage rates. 
6.  Health, Access to Care, and Expenditure Differ by Employment Type 
In this section, I investigate whether the health related outcomes of interest vary by employment status 
of men in the households in line with the above presented methodology. When outcomes of interest 
are  children,  mother’s  characteristics  such  as  their  age,  education,  and  some  behavioral  patterns 
including breastfeeding and smoking and qat chewing are added as well as household conditions. 
Likewise, women’s and households characteristics are respectively added depending on the outcomes 
of interest. In each case, the selection into each employment type is determined by primary men’s 
characteristics – father, husband, or household head.
 28   
 
  
                                                 
28 In all estimations, Z is a subset of X, where X determines the selection into each type of employment. Some of the 
variables in Z such as child’s age and mothers’ education, are added as well to X to make it a subset of X although 
those variables may not directly affect men’s selection into each type of employment.  21 
 
Children’s Nutrition and Health 
Selectivity corrected estimation of severe stunting in urban and rural areas show several consistent 
patterns (Tables 5-6). Mothers’ age and education, if not monotonically, reduce the likelihood of 
stunting. The number of children under six is strongly associated with stunting, suggesting resource 
(food and nutrients) constraints as main factor in child’s malnutrition. The positive impacts of higher 
income in reducing child stunting is particularly clear among urban self employed families, although 
the  relationship  is  unclear  in  rural  areas.  Mothers’  behavior  of  smoking  and  qat  chewing,  and 
breastfeeding has significant impacts on child’s stunting, more evident in rural than urban areas. 
Among the variables of water supply and quality conditions, water supply inside households without 
the  need  to  fetch,  and  treated  water  can  significantly  reduce  stunting.  The  findings  confirm  the 
importance of healthy behavior to promote healthy outcomes. Finally, the coefficients of selectivity 
are  statistically  significant  for  some  employment  types,  indicating  a  mild effect  of  selectivity  on 
child’s nutrition.   
Similar results are found for child’s underweight, another indicator of nutrition, and child’s 
health captured by the indicator  of illness.
29 The effects of water supply and quality are strongly 
associated with  both underweight and illness. This reconfirms the importance of water supply  and 
quality conditions. Mothers’ behavior seems to have important consequences for both child’s health 
and nutrition. Mother’s smoking and qat chewing is more closely related with child’s illness than 
nutrition, whereas breastfeeding is more closely related with child’s nutrition than illness. As they 




                                                 




Women’s illness is an indicator of chronic and non-chronic disease, illness, and accidents, and the 
estimation results for urban and rural areas are presented in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. In both areas, 
the likelihood of illness increases with women’s age. No distinctive pattern emerges regarding the 
effects of educational attainment on health, although educated group relative to no education one 
tends to have slightly better outcomes. Women’s risky behavior and living conditions, which are 
important factors in child’s outcomes as shown above, also have strong impacts on the likelihood of 
women’s illness. That is smoking and qat chewing increases the likelihood of illness, whereas better 
water supply and quality reduces illness. Number of children under six is negatively associated with 
women’s illness. Mothers with young children are probably more health conscious and careful not to 
fall  ill.  Alternatively,  healthier  women  may  have  higher  parity  as  well  as  low  infant  fatality. 
Selectivity is statistically significant for some employment types. 
  No strong relationship exists between household income and health indicators, suggesting no 
better  health  outcomes  among  well  off  households.  Instead,  the estimation  reveals  the  somewhat 
counterintuitive  finding  that  women’s  illness  is  often  more  prevalent  among  the  highest  income 
quintile. Although puzzling, this finding can be explained if higher income women have better access 
to medical service and thus able to learn about their illness. This may suggest the limitation of self 
reported health measures and the importance of objective measures such as the ones based on BMI 
(Body Mass Index) or more objective self reported measures.
30 
   
Health Outcomes by Employment Type and Region 
The group comparisons of outcomes presented in Table 9 show significant differences between formal 
and informal households. The  predicted probabilities of child stunting and wom en’s  illness  by 
                                                 
30 The limitations of subjective self reported health measures in assessing physical capacity are widely recognized. 
For review of health measures, see Currie and Madrain (1999). 23 
 
employment type  show more prevalent malnutrition and poor health among informal than formal 
households (Panel A, row (1)). When predicted based on each type’s own characteristics, in urban 
areas, the probabilities of stunting ranges from 28 to 32 percent among informal households, while 
those among formal households are significantly lower by 2 to 7 percentage points. Within formal 
households, the difference between H and P is somewhat muted, and so is the difference between N 
and S within informal households.  
  The probability of stunting at each type households for an average child also suggests better 
outcomes among formal than informal (Panel A, row (2)). For example, for 48 percent of children the 
probability  of  stunting  in  household  H  is  lower  than  the  predicted  probability  in  other  types  of 
households. For only 36 percent of children the probability of stunting in household N is lower than 
the predicted probabilities in other types of households. Although both findings show consistent story 
about better outcomes among formal than informal, there are slight discrepancy in terms of within 
sector differences. Among formal households, H seems to be better off than P, and among informal 
households, S seems to be better off than N especially for women’s illness. The slightly different 
results  between  the  one based  on  each  type’s  characteristics  and  the  other  based  on the average 
characteristics  suggest  that  there  exist  some  differences  pertaining  to  each  type  that  engender 
differential outcomes for observationally identical individuals. 
Finally, the t test results reconfirm that the group disparities are statistically significant, and a 
large  part  of  the  discrepancy  is  due  to  the  characteristics  pertaining  to  the  job  rather  than  the 
differences in individuals’ characteristics (the Oaxaca decomposition). The bottom panel of column 
(2) shows, for example, that the likelihood of women’s illness would be higher among all of H, P, and 
S than N, if the individuals’ observable characteristics are the only difference across all the types. 
However,  due  to  the  type  specific  effects  of  the  observable  characteristics  (column  (3))  and 
unobservable heterogeneity (column (4)), P gets lower predicted illness than N, suggesting P has the 24 
 
job specific features that have positive influence on outcomes. The decomposition results show that 
there exists a large group disparity even for observationally identical individuals. 
7.  Accessibility and Affordability of Health Service 
Having  found  significant  group  disparities  even  among  observationally  identical  individuals,  this 
section discusses underlying factors that are likely related to the differential health outcomes across 
different types. In particular, we consider accessibility and affordability of health service as mentioned 
above. Accessibility to care is measured by an indicator of receiving medical help of women, assisted 
delivery, and child immunization, and affordability is measured with a few variables regarding health 
expenditure.  
 
Access to Care 
Throughout  all  outcomes  and  regions,  the  findings  on  the  determinants  of  access  to  service  are 
consistent. It is positively associated with education, household income, and the presence of disabled 
household member (See Table 10 for the results for indicator of medical help). The relationship of 
access to service to education and income are not always monotonic. That is those with some primary 
education are not always better off than those with no education. However, in general, those with 
primary and above and 4
th and 5
th income quintiles are better off than their less educated and lower 
income counterparts. A significantly positive effect of the presence of disabled household member in 
access  to  care  reflects  the  information  impacts,  as  such  households  would  have  likely  already 
experienced medical help or lack of it. The number of children under six shows negative effect, 
reflecting limited mobility among mothers with young children. Finally, some of selectivity measures 25 
 
show  statistical  significance  in  both  regions,  indicating  the  nonrandom  assignment  to  each 
employment type significantly affects outcomes.
31  
Group disparities confirms better access to service in urban than rural areas, and among 
formal, especially those with health insurance, than informal households (Table 11). Access to service 
measured with the indicators of medical help, assisted delivery, and child immunization all show 
consistent findings. In urban areas, it appears that the formal households with health insurance have 
clearly  better  access  to  health  service  than  any  other  households.  When  predicted  at  average 
individuals with average characteristics (Panel B), the probability that the best outcome is observed at 
formal households H is the highest, suggesting that seemingly identical individuals would have better 
access to service in households H. In rural areas, the results are more mixed than those in urban areas.  
 
Health Expenditure 
As noted earlier, health expenditure occurs mainly to the relatively well off households that can afford 
to  pay  for  health  service  and  those  with  severe  illness.  Among  the  households  with  positive 
expenditure  on  health,  Table  12  presents  the  results  of  the  share  of  health  spending  out  of  total 
household expenditure. The share is lower for the more educated and higher income households than 
the less educated and lower income counterparts. The share is negatively related with smoking and qat 
behavior, suggesting that those less risk averse in health tend to spend less on health. The presence of 
disabled household member largely increases the share of health spending. The increase in the share is 
as high as 31 percent among urban informal wage workers (N), and 77 percent among rural formal 
health insured workers though statistically not significant.  
Figures  3  and  4  depict  the  distribution  of  this  share  by  region.  In  urban  areas,  informal 
households tend to spend slightly higher proportion of their consumption on health, although the 
                                                 
31 Note that the results for assisted delivery and child immunization are not presented here, as the findings convey 
similar results. 26 
 
difference  seems  to  be  marginal  (Figure  3).  Formal  households,  both  H  and  P,  have  thicker 
distribution  at  lower  value  than  informal  households.  In  rural  areas,  formal  households  face  less 
variance in the proportion of health spending than the informal households (Figure  4). The health 
expenditure  is  more  widely  spread  out  among  informal  households,  whereas  formal  households, 
especially  those  with  health  insurance,  is  more  condensed  around  8  percent  (log  value=-2.5)  of 
household consumption. 
  The likelihood  of  catastrophic expenditure,  if  defined  one  when  more  than  14  percent  of 
household  consumption  is  spent  on  health,  is  higher  among  informal  households  than  formal 
households.
32 However, there is virtually no difference in the density of those who spend more than 
half of household consumption on health. Note though that selection into positive spending on hea lth 
is not accounted, and care is needed to interpret these figures. 
    
   
                                                 
32 The proportion of health expenditure is 14 percent of total household consumption when the log value is -2. 27 
 







Figure 4. Proportion of health spending: Rural areas 
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8.  Social Assistance and Informal Safety Net 
Nonlabor transfers including public transfers from government and public programs, private transfer 
from NGOs and religious groups and other types of income would serve as an informal safety net in 
the case of external shock. As shown earlier, a disabled household member is a distress factor in 
health expenditure especially for informal sector households (See Table 12). I examine to what extent 
extra nonlabor income, out of which the largest proportion is social assistance, reduces the financial 
burden associated with household member with disability and how it varies with household type. 
Inter-temporal  resource  allocation  –  savings  and  loans–  is  a  commonly  used  risk  coping 
mechanism, when the above mentioned social assistance does not reach. Households often resort to 
informal sources such as friends and relatives (not residing together) rather  than banks or money 
lenders to borrow money.
33 The likelihood of  borrowing increases with the presence of a disabled 
household member. The question is again the extent to which the health shock increases the likelihood 
of borrowing, and how it varies with household types. 
The  coefficients  of  the  indicator  of  disabled  household  member   in  the  regressions  on 
indicators of transfer and borrowing are presented in Table 13. In urban areas, disabled household 
member significantly increases the likelihood of transfer incomes  among informal households by 6 
percentage points. Borrowing also increases with the residence of disabled household member by 6 to 
13 percentage points. The likelihood of borrowing in presence of disabled household member is the 
largest for the self employed (S). In rural areas, the likelihood of receiving transfer income due to 
disability  is  highest  among  formal  pension  covered  households  (P).  The  incidence  of  borrowing 
increases with disabled household member by 9 to 11 percentage points, and is slightly higher for 
informal households. This suggests that urban informal households rely more on both types of safety 
net including social assistance and borrowing in presence of large spending needs than the formal 
                                                 
33 Sources of the outstanding loan include relatives (30%), friends and neighbors (35%), and traders (29%). 29 
 
households. In rural areas, on the other hand, the transfers are more available for the pension covered 
formal households, and the informal households rely primarily on borrowing. 
9.  Conclusion 
Like other developing countries and transition economies, the informal sector provides many Yemenis 
work opportunities and consists of a large proportion of the labor market.  A substantial proportion of 
the wage employed and almost of all self-employed workers, not covered by any social insurance 
programs, are more than 70 percent of workers. About 52 percent of households do not have anyone 
working in the formal sector. These workers and their households are believed to be more vulnerable 
to various risks due to the limited access to social insurance among others. Health risks are one the 
most common risks faced by many individuals and households, and particularly so in Yemen where 
national health outcomes are known to lag behind.  
This paper investigated the relationship between informality and health risks, noting that there 
is  little  empirical  evidence  of  differential  vulnerability  to  risks  across  employment  types.  I  first 
outlined the main characteristics of workers by employment and coverage status. Findings show that 
formal wage workers, mostly public sector workers, tend to be substantially more educated, older, and 
more experienced. They generally fall on a higher income quintile, although their earnings are not 
significantly  larger  than  those  of  informal  wage  workers.  They  are  less  likely  to  work  in  the 
agriculture sector, and more likely to receive regular payment and benefits. Formal wage employed 
households are more likely to have current pensioners, implying a high intergenerational correlation 
of public sector jobs. Among informal workers, self-employed workers are less educated than wage 
employed workers, but their income level is not lower. A large disparity in worker and household 
characteristics was found between urban and rural areas. 
Health outcomes widely vary along the employment types, generally better for formal than 
informal households. Selection corrected model accounts for unobservable heterogeneity that affects 30 
 
sector assignment in determining health related outcomes as well as observed characteristics. In most 
cases, unobserved heterogeneity significantly affects outcomes of interest, implying that omitting this 
would bias the estimates. Among observable characteristics, behavioral variables such as smoking and 
qat  chewing  and  breastfeeding,  and  water  supply  and  quality  conditions  play  important  roles  in 
determining health. We found a large disparity in outcomes between urban and rural areas.  
The persistent gap between formal and informal households, even after factoring in observable 
and unobservable differences in characteristics, suggests that factors related to each employment type 
may explain group disparities. The results on accessibility and affordability of health care show that 
formal households have better access to service with less financial burden, although only a mild effect 
of  health  insurance  is  found.  In  the  presence  of  disabled  workers,  households  face  a  significant 
increase  in  health  spending,  and  they  tend  to  rely  on  informal  safety  net  such  as  transfers  and 
borrowing. 
  Given a wide heterogeneity between formal and informal and even within those sectors, in 
their  exposure  to  health  risks,  health  outcomes,  coping  mechanism,  and  spending,  and  also  their 
poverty, more research is needed to find a suitable protection scheme that combines risk pooling and 
saving  for  the  poor.  In  the  mean  time,  rather  than  providing  protection  through  work,  a  general 
approach to promote better living conditions and healthy behavior would be appropriate to address 
widespread health and malnutrition problems. For example, child stunting and related diseases are 
preventable  by  early  interventions  including  micronutrient  fortification  and  education  on 
breastfeeding practice (Cho and Rassas, 2009). As shown in the results, water supply and quality 
condition as well as mother’s behavior are very important factors in health, and should be promoted 
regardless of employment status or availability of social insurance.  
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Table 1.  
Summary Statistics by Employment Type and Region 
   All     Urban     Rural 
  
Formal   Informal      Formal   Informal     Formal   Informal 
(H)  (P)  (N)  (S)    (H)  (P)  (N)  (S)    (H)  (P)  (N)  (S) 
Proportion  7.2%  18.0%  37.6%  37.3%    9.3%  22.6%  36.9%  31.2%    3.9%  11.2%  40.2%  44.7% 
A.  Worker Characteristics                     
Urban  57.7%  45.2%  25.5%  19.8%    100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%    0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Age  40.0  38.5  39.4  47.6    41.7  41.0  39.6  45.5    37.8  36.4  39.3  48.2 
Male  98.1%  98.6%  99.2%  98.4%    96.7%  96.9%  97.7%  98.3%    100.0%  100.0%  99.7%  98.4% 
No 
schooling  15.5%  12.0%  50.9%  67.6%    12.4%  11.2%  33.8%  49.6%    19.8%  12.6%  56.6%  72.1% 
Primary -  7.3%  6.4%  15.6%  10.1%    5.4%  6.4%  12.9%  14.7%    10.0%  6.5%  16.5%  8.9% 
Secondary  26.0%  25.4%  20.0%  14.4%    20.3%  20.5%  24.9%  21.7%    33.8%  29.4%  18.3%  12.6% 
Tertiary +  51.1%  56.2%  13.6%  7.9%    61.9%  61.9%  28.3%  14.0%    36.5%  51.6%  8.6%  6.4% 
HH Size  7.0  7.2  7.0  8.3    6.8  6.8  6.5  8.0    7.2  7.5  7.2  8.4 
N. Children  1.5  1.7  1.5  1.6    1.2  1.3  1.3  1.5    1.8  2.0  1.6  1.6 
Born here  64.0%  73.4%  78.9%  84.7%    41.7%  48.9%  46.0%  53.3%    92.4%  95.3%  93.0%  93.0% 
B.  Job Characteristics                     
Agriculture  1.2%  1.0%  29.9%  60.5%    1.0%  0.4%  7.0%  12.3%    1.6%  1.4%  38.5%  72.4% 
N. jobs >1  18.7%  32.6%  34.5%  13.9%    11.2%  15.1%  10.5%  6.1%    28.9%  47.0%  43.4%  15.8% 
Public 
sector  93.8%  98.8%  4.9%  .    91.8%  98.1%  9.4%  .    96.6%  99.4%  3.4%  . 
Earnings 
(month,YR)  41,443  28,368  35,739  .    48,102  32,965  44,055  .    32,349  24,574  32,914  . 
Hours per 
week  42.3  38.9  48.9  .    41.4  38.2  52.1  .    43.5  39.4  47.8  . 
Paid  
leave  98.1%  98.1%  6.2%  .    96.6%  96.3%  15.5%  .    100.0%  99.5%  3.0%  . 
Health 
Insurance  100.0%  0.0%  2.0%      100.0%  0.0%  5.2%      100.0%  0.0%  0.9%   
N. years of 
this job  13.7  12.8  9.2  .    14.8  14.6  8.2  .    12.3  11.3  9.6  . 




(Table 1. Continued) 
  All    Urban    Rural 
  Formal  Informal    Formal  Informal    Formal  Informal 
  (H)  (P)  (N)  (S)    (H)  (P)  (N)  (S)    (H)  (P)  (N)  (S) 
C.  Household characteristics                     
Pensioner 
in HH  11.2%  9.0%  3.9%  4.1%    15.8%  13.3%  8.0%  5.6%    5.3%  5.2%  2.1%  3.7% 
Enough 
Water  53.6%  63.0%  62.2%  65.2%    55.1%  68.1%  62.1%  65.5%    51.6%  58.5%  62.2%  65.2% 
Water in 
HH  63.0%  58.2%  37.5%  40.6%    78.7%  85.5%  76.5%  78.2%    42.5%  33.8%  20.8%  30.6% 
Water 




152,262  164,523  92,284  168,438    223,798  209,313  142,680  306,896    69,061  128,900  75,090  133,825 
62.4%  65.1%  59.5%  65.8%    58.1%  63.7%  59.3%  66.5%    68.2%  66.2%  59.5%  65.6% 
Quintile1  13.8%  12.1%  34.7%  28.0%    4.8%  5.9%  13.4%  12.2%    26.2%  17.3%  42.0%  31.9% 
Quintile2  19.7%  18.6%  22.2%  21.1%    9.1%  9.1%  15.7%  16.6%    34.0%  26.4%  24.5%  22.3% 
Quintile3  14.6%  21.2%  16.2%  19.8%    14.6%  16.7%  18.0%  18.9%    14.7%  24.9%  15.6%  20.0% 
Quintile4  20.7%  23.2%  13.3%  16.2%    25.7%  25.2%  20.4%  22.4%    13.8%  21.5%  10.9%  14.7% 
Quintile5  31.2%  24.9%  13.5%  14.8%    45.8%  43.0%  32.6%  29.9%    11.3%  9.9%  7.0%  11.1% 
Notes: H denotes formal wage workers with health insurance as well as pension, P denotes formal wage workers with pension coverage only, N denotes informal 
wage workers without social insurance, and S denotes self employed workers without social insurance. Panel A through D present the summary statistics and 
proportions of workers, jobs, and households by employment type and residence.  
 
    
 
 
Table 2.  
Health, Access to Care, Expenditure by Household Type 
      All     Urban     Rural 
  
 
Formal   Informal      Formal   Informal     Formal   Informal 
      (H)  (P)  (N)  (S)    (H)  (P)  (N)  (S)    (H)  (P)  (N)  (S) 
A, Health outcomes 
                   
Women’s illness  17.6%  17.2%  18.9%  15.6%    22.3%  20.1%  22.0%  22.3%    11.6%  14.9%  17.8%  13.9% 
Children  
stunting  28.4%  26.5%  32.3%  35.7%    26.2%  22.6%  27.7%  32.5%    35.0%  35.5%  37.6%  39.4% 
Children 
underweight  12.1%  9.0%  12.4%  14.3%    10.6%  8.7%  10.8%  13.5%    16.3%  9.9%  14.3%  15.2% 
Children Illness  21.4%  21.4%  20.8%  19.7%    22.4%  23.5%  23.0%  22.4%    18.5%  16.7%  18.2%  16.7% 
B. Access to Service 
                       
Women’s 
Assisted Delivery  42.3%  40.1%  30.0%  29.6% 
 
61.4%  58.9%  52.4%  52.1% 
 
20.1%  27.7%  22.5%  24.1% 
Medical Help 
when ill  92.2%  87.3%  85.0%  85.8% 
 
95.3%  89.9%  89.4%  89.8% 
 
88.1%  85.3%  83.5%  84.8% 
Children 
Immunization  54.0%  51.8%  41.0%  41.3% 
 
60.1%  60.7%  55.5%  56.5% 
 
48.6%  47.2%  36.9%  38.0% 
C. Health Expenditure 
                       
Log(per capita 
spending)  8.3  8.0  8.0  8.1 
 
8.6  8.3  8.4  8.2 
 
7.7  7.9  7.8  8.0 
Share of health 
spending  15.9%  15.7%  17.3%  17.4% 
 
15.8%  16.0%  16.9%  16.1% 
 
16.1%  14.9%  17.7%  18.7% 
Catastrophic 1  8.8%  10.3%  12.4%  12.1% 
 
10.1%  8.5%  10.0%  9.4% 
 
7.2%  11.6%  13.3%  12.8% 
Catastrophic 2  4.9%  5.6%  7.2%  7.3% 
 
5.5%  4.5%  5.8%  4.3% 
 
4.2%  6.4%  7.7%  8.0% 
Notes: Panel A presents the shares of women and children who are reported to be ill or malnourished. Women’s illness is defined to be 1 if they report chronic or 
nonchronic disease, and sickness and accidents. Children’s stunting and underweight are both indicators of severe symptoms when the standardized z-score based 
on Body Mass Index for each measure is below -3 Standard Deviations. Panel B presents 3 measures that capture access to health service. Assisted delivery is 
calculated among those women who have given birth. Medical help when ill is a self reported variable indicating the respondent can seek professional medical help 
when falling ill. Panel C shows health expenditure of each household. Share of health spending is the ratio of health expenditure out of total household expenditure 
and calculated among the families for whom health spending occurred. Catastrophic expenditure 1 and 2 are defined to be 1 when the household health expenditure 




   
Table 3.  
Multinomial Logit Estimates of Employment Type Assignment: Base category is informal wage employment (N) 
  Urban  Rural 












Age  0.053***  0.047***  0.027***  0.046***  0.048***  0.046*** 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.003) 
Married  0.311**  0.525***  0.131*  0.242  0.916***  -0.341*** 
  (0.122)  (0.087)  (0.069)  (0.205)  (0.149)  (0.088) 
Less than primary  0.916***  0.887***  0.025  1.240***  1.366***  0.052 
  (0.193)  (0.132)  (0.085)  (0.314)  (0.222)  (0.091) 
Primary  1.636***  1.513***  -0.023  2.270***  2.601***  0.076 
  (0.156)  (0.114)  (0.078)  (0.264)  (0.191)  (0.090) 
Secondary +  2.638***  2.722***  -0.186**  3.298***  4.030***  0.405*** 
  (0.148)  (0.110)  (0.080)  (0.272)  (0.196)  (0.103) 
Household head  0.637***  0.416***  0.075  0.115  -0.040  -0.170* 
  (0.127)  (0.091)  (0.077)  (0.207)  (0.138)  (0.091) 
Household size  0.034***  0.033***  0.075***  -0.014  -0.003  0.036*** 
  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.007) 
Pensioner   0.457***  0.317***  -0.144  0.261  0.194  0.264 
in the HH  (0.132)  (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.328)  (0.233)  (0.172) 
Born here  0.223**  0.234***  0.270***  -0.334  0.332  0.250** 
  (0.087)  (0.064)  (0.053)  (0.273)  (0.209)  (0.117) 
Constant  -6.194***  -5.032***  -2.052***  -4.892***  -6.019***  -1.680*** 
  (0.296)  (0.215)  (0.161)  (0.525)  (0.392)  (0.196) 
Governorate 
dummies  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R squared  0.25  0.17 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Pseudo R squared value for the estimation is 0.25 and 0.17 for urban and rural, respectively. Formal (H) denotes 
formal wage employed with pension and health insurance, Formal (P) denotes formal employed with pension coverage only, and Self (S) denotes self employment 
without any social insurance. Omitted category is the Informal (N) which denotes wage employment without social insurance coverage. The 21 governorate 





Table 4.  
Selectivity Corrected Estimation of Log (Hourly wage rate) among the Wage Employed 






A.  Urban  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Age  0.026***  0.003  0.018***  0.003  0.012***  0.002 
Job duration  0.038**  0.015  -0.003  0.009  0.033***  0.008 
Duration squared  -0.001**  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001***  0.000 
Primary  0.284**  0.120  0.172***  0.066  0.109**  0.054 
Secondary   0.546***  0.115  0.378***  0.077  0.145***  0.054 
Tertiary+  0.977***  0.142  0.631***  0.114  0.340***  0.085 
Agriculture  0.770**  0.201  -0.515  0.551  -0.064  0.074 
    -0.376**  0.176  0.166  0.130  -0.105  0.101 
Constant  2.243  1.492  7.045***  1.335  5.207***  0.310 
B.  Rural             
Age  0.011*  0.006  0.015***  0.004  0.009***  0.002 
Job duration  0.074***  0.024  0.026*  0.014  0.016***  0.006 
Duration squared  -0.002**  0.001  -0.001  0.000  -0.000**  0.000 
Primary  0.219  0.165  0.167  0.107  0.008  0.040 
Secondary   0.466***  0.144  0.473***  0.119  0.131***  0.040 
Tertiary+  0.755***  0.172  0.770***  0.161  0.262***  0.075 
Agriculture  -0.238  0.567  -0.163  0.341  0.383***  0.048 
    -0.316  0.200  -0.077  0.115  0.019  0.078 
Constant  4.851***  1.612  5.087***  1.007  4.908***  0.326 
Note:   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard Errors are obtained from bootstrapping. In all estimation, governorate dummy variables are included.  Job 
duration indicates the duration of work experience at the current job. The first stage multinomial logit estimation, though not exactly identical due to omission 





Table 5.  
Selectivity Corrected Estimation of Child’s Severe Stunting in Urban Areas 








  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Child’s age  0.030***  0.009  0.011*  0.006  0.012**  0.004  0.023***  0.005 
Age  -0.001  0.004  -0.003  0.002  -0.000  0.002  -0.005***  0.001 
Less than primary  -0.054  0.073  -0.082***  0.027  0.017  0.037  -0.027  0.022 
Primary  -0.111**  0.051  -0.071**  0.035  -0.010  0.035  -0.032  0.032 
Secondary +  -0.091***  0.019  -0.037  0.027  -0.073***  0.021  -0.030  0.038 
Number of children<=5  0.011  0.022  0.011***  0.003  0.017***  0.004  -0.004  0.006 
Quintile2  0.038  0.067  0.002  0.035  -0.039  0.046  -0.126***  0.032 
Quintile3  0.042  0.069  0.003  0.046  0.001  0.057  -0.107***  0.038 
Quintile4  0.025  0.028  -0.018  0.039  -0.079  0.053  -0.132***  0.037 
Quintile5  0.076  0.064  -0.067***  0.021  -0.057  0.054  -0.177***  0.037 
Smoking/ qat chewing  0.004  0.093  0.002  0.024  -0.010  0.044  -0.035  0.035 
Breastfeeding  -0.144**  0.076  0.035  0.071  0.069  0.117  0.028  0.118 
Enough Water  0.001  0.050  0.018  0.038  0.023  0.014  0.046**  0.017 
Water supply inside house  -0.028  0.046  -0.054  0.045  -0.026  0.047  0.012  0.019 
Water treated  -0.062**  0.031  -0.046**  0.023  -0.059  0.044  0.017  0.031 
    -0.057  0.083  -0.007  0.025  0.109**  0.042  0.092**  0.036 
Constant  -0.183  0.534  0.043  0.569  0.206  0.128  0.363*  0.208 
Note:   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard Errors are obtained from bootstrapping. Omitted categories are “no education” and “Quintile 1.” The results 
of selection equation are not presented here. In all estimation, governorate dummies are included. 





Table 6.  
Selectivity Corrected Estimation of Child’s Severe Stunting in Rural Areas 








  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Child’s age  0.023  0.025  0.005  0.011  0.012***  0.004  0.020***  0.008 
Age  -0.011**  0.005  -0.006**  0.003  0.001  0.001  -0.002  0.001 
Less than primary  0.015  0.049  -0.031  0.058  0.060  0.043  -0.039  0.065 
Primary  -0.136  0.177  -0.019  0.075  0.011  0.054  -0.079***  0.022 
Secondary +  -0.025  0.574  -0.138**  0.064  0.172  0.155  0.034  0.143 
Number of children<=5  0.067**  0.036  -0.004  0.013  0.013**  0.005  0.018**  0.008 
Quintile2  -0.058  0.123  0.043  0.035  -0.026  0.036  0.025  0.043 
Quintile3  0.179***  0.036  -0.069***  0.025  -0.008  0.050  -0.024  0.050 
Quintile4  0.032  0.232  -0.053  0.040  0.032  0.054  0.010  0.033 
Quintile5  0.119  0.253  -0.049  0.038  -0.041  0.077  0.037*  0.018 
Smoking/ qat chewing  0.259**  0.095  0.123***  0.045  0.022  0.041  0.034  0.038 
Breastfeeding  -0.145  0.249  -0.360***  0.047  -0.082  0.122  -0.271*  0.138 
Enough Water  -0.012  0.149  0.049  0.031  0.009  0.034  -0.039**  0.017 
Water supply inside house  -0.147**  0.054  -0.101**  0.044  0.034**  0.016  -0.024  0.039 
Water treated  -0.094  0.224  -0.096  0.121  -0.064  0.067  -0.239***  0.045 
    0.195**  0.089  0.081  0.056  0.075  0.060  -0.084***  0.015 
Constant  1.594***  0.141  0.296**  0.117  0.650**  0.250  0.043  0.153 
Note:   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard Errors are obtained from bootstrapping. Omitted categories are “no education” and “Quintile 1.” The 









   
Table 7.   
Selectivity Corrected Estimation of Women’s illness in Urban Areas 








  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Age  0.006**  0.003  0.004***  0.001  0.009***  0.001  0.005***  0.001 
Primary  0.110**  0.050  -0.011  0.016  0.053*  0.030  -0.008  0.012 
Secondary  0.014  0.050  -0.042***  0.015  0.019  0.012  0.001  0.040 
Tertiary +  -0.087  0.059  -0.054***  0.019  -0.012  0.023  -0.072***  0.021 
Number of children<=5  0.001  0.008  -0.013**  0.005  -0.006  0.004  -0.011***  0.002 
Quintile2  0.037  0.096  0.002  0.030  0.039  0.048  0.022  0.024 
Quintile3  0.000  0.080  0.038  0.025  0.069  0.052  0.060***  0.021 
Quintile4  0.070  0.106  0.032***  0.010  0.087  0.055  0.016  0.027 
Quintile5  0.125*  0.071  0.071***  0.014  0.132***  0.038  0.078**  0.036 
Smoking/ qat chewing  0.061  0.049  0.074***  0.024  0.084***  0.028  0.060***  0.014 
Enough Water  -0.045**  0.019  -0.054**  0.025  -0.032  0.027  -0.028  0.020 
Water supply inside house  -0.020  0.047  -0.051***  0.010  0.009  0.018  -0.033  0.021 
Water treated  0.047  0.047  0.028  0.017  0.021  0.021  0.051**  0.022 
    -0.098***  0.031  -0.003  0.037  0.107***  0.033  0.030  0.041 
Constant  -0.176  0.526  0.272  0.438  -0.274  0.198  -0.161*  0.093 
Note:   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard Errors are obtained from bootstrapping. Omitted categories are “no education” and “Quintile 1.”  The 






Table 8.  
Selectivity Corrected Estimation of Women’s illness in Rural Areas 








  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Age  0.002  0.003  -0.002  0.002  0.006***  0.001  0.006***  0.002 
Primary  -0.104  0.203  -0.006  0.024  0.028  0.025  0.040**  0.020 
Secondary  0.096  0.104  -0.100***  0.026  -0.003  0.042  -0.036  0.023 
Tertiary +  -0.124  0.081  -0.064  0.046  0.002  0.049  0.021  0.072 
Number of children<=5  0.002  0.016  -0.016***  0.004  -0.010**  0.004  -0.004  0.003 
Quintile2  0.049  0.092  -0.028  0.018  -0.006  0.024  -0.031  0.020 
Quintile3  0.077  0.093  0.029**  0.012  0.008  0.013  -0.003  0.013 
Quintile4  -0.001  0.129  0.029  0.028  0.029  0.042  0.010  0.026 
Quintile5  0.036  0.135  0.057  0.039  0.077**  0.034  0.027  0.060 
Smoking/ qat chewing  0.172  0.189  -0.001  0.050  0.069***  0.026  0.040**  0.017 
Enough Water  0.013  0.180  -0.022  0.045  0.031  0.021  -0.020  0.017 
Water supply inside house  -0.135***  0.035  -0.018  0.045  -0.046**  0.025  -0.029**  0.011 
Water treated  0.263  0.304  -0.016  0.077  0.009  0.020  -0.021  0.016 
    0.224  0.148  -0.049***  0.012  -0.005  0.029  -0.057  0.064 
Constant  0.599  0.470  0.000  0.074  0.101  0.104  0.407**  0.218 
Note:   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard Errors are obtained from bootstrapping. Omitted categories are “no education” and “Quintile 1.” The results of 
selection equation are not presented here. See Table 3 for multinomial logit estimation of selection. 
 
 




   
Table 9.  
Group Comparison and Decompositions 
  Urban Areas  Rural Areas 
A.  Group Comparison 
Formal  Informal  Formal  Informal 
H  P  N  S  H  P  N  S 
(1)    Predicted probability             
Child stunting  26.6%  24.4%  28.1%  31.6%  34.6%  32.2%  37.2%  36.7% 
Woman’s illness  21.1%  20.0%  20.7%  21.5%  12.3%  10.9%  15.9%  16.6% 
(2)  Proportion of the sample with the best outcome             
Child’s stunting  48.2%  35.2%  36.1%  32.4%  52.5%  50.7%  24.4%  27.7% 
Woman’s illness  34.5%  32.1%  13.4%  31.3%  53.2%  22.5%  9.1%  21.7% 
B. Decompositions               
(1) 
   
                
(2) 
    
       
        
(3) 
                      
(4) 
             
(5) 
   
                
(6) 
    
       
        
(7) 
                      
(8) 
Child stunting                 
H-N  -1.5**  -0.6  -19.9  19.0  -2.6  -7.4  30.4  -25.6 
P-N  -3.5***  -1.8  -13.5  11.8  -5.0***  4.1  -6.7  -2.4 
S-N  3.6***  2.4  -0.7  1.9  -0.4  4.1  -18.3  13.8 
Woman’s illness                 
H-N  0.4  6.4  -31.0  25.0  -3.7**  -2.3  37.5  -38.9 
P-N  -0.7**  2.8  -14.8  11.3  -5.0***  -1.6  -8.8  5.4 
S-N  0.8**  4.1  -11.5  8.2  0.6**  5.5  -8.7  3.8 
Note:   ***, **, and denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, from the t test whether the estimate is significantly different from 
zero. Panel A shows predicted probability of child’s stunting and women’s illness at each type. Panel B shows t test results. The first t test (columns (1) and (3)) 
conducted for each type is the difference of mean of each probability. The second t test (columns (2) and (4)) shows difference in predicted probability measured 
at mean characteristics.  
 
 
Table 10.  
Selectivity Corrected Estimation of Access to Health Service 








A.  Urban  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Age   0.002  0.002  -0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000 
Less than primary  0.047  0.029  -0.017  0.034  -0.010  0.028  0.012  0.018 
Primary  0.025  0.020  0.073***  0.024  0.076***  0.018  0.080***  0.026 
Secondary +  0.047  0.038  0.051***  0.019  0.063***  0.019  0.046  0.034 
Number of children<=5  0.002  0.008  -0.025***  0.005  -0.016***  0.005  -0.013***  0.003 
Quintile2  -0.005  0.034  0.002  0.043  -0.002  0.035  -0.024  0.029 
Quintile3  0.003  0.032  0.040  0.056  0.005  0.033  -0.011  0.028 
Quintile4  -0.025  0.044  0.081*  0.047  0.017  0.033  -0.030  0.027 
Quintile5  -0.014  0.033  0.092**  0.044  0.061**  0.028  -0.021  0.027 
Disabled member in the HH  0.025  0.022  0.052***  0.014  0.040*  0.021  0.030**  0.012 
    -0.000  0.044  -0.078***  0.021  0.022  0.044  -0.013  0.037 
Constant  0.895  0.086  0.747***  0.087  0.825***  0.061  0.849***  0.038 
B.  Rural  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Age   0.009  0.006  -0.006***  0.002  -0.002**  0.001  -0.004***  0.001 
Less than primary  -0.199**  0.086  -0.198***  0.059  -0.038  0.033  0.004  0.047 
Primary  0.090  0.089  0.051  0.041  0.072  0.048  0.110**  0.054 
Secondary +  0.175**  0.088  -0.030  0.056  0.043  0.076  -0.227  0.181 
Number of children<=5  -0.020  0.026  -0.019*  0.011  -0.022***  0.006  -0.019***  0.006 
Quintile2  0.035  0.126  0.090*  0.049  0.025  0.020  0.091***  0.025 
Quintile3  -0.047  0.130  0.111**  0.043  0.024  0.031  0.093**  0.036 
Quintile4  0.298**  0.127  0.097**  0.043  -0.006  0.032  0.085***  0.032 
Quintile5  0.087  0.154  0.179***  0.041  0.024  0.031  0.082**  0.036 
Disabled member in the HH  0.117  0.110  0.037  0.036  0.018  0.022  0.048**  0.024 
    0.456***  0.123  -0.047  0.041  -0.098***  0.044  0.204***  0.054 
Constant  1.283***  0.340  0.928***  0.092  0.808  0.051  1.081***  0.092 
Note:   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard Errors are obtained from bootstrapping. Omitted categories are “no education” and “Quintile 1.” The results 
of selection equation are not presented here.  
 
 
Table 11.  
Group Comparison in Access to Service 
  Urban Areas  Rural Areas 
  Formal  Informal  Formal  Informal 
  H  P  N  S  H  P  N  S 
A.  Predicted probability             
Medical Help  94.8%  84.0%  83.8%  84.4%  86.3%  83.2%  80.5%  81.2% 
Assisted Delivery  56.9%  52.5%  50.5%  47.2%  26.4%  28.8%  23.6%  25.5% 
Child immunization  57.9%  59.5%  53.7%  54.2%  48.3%  47.0%  40.1%  41.0% 
B.  Proportion of the sample with the best outcome             
Medical Help  32.9%  22.1%  24.2%  32.1%  39.5%  32.5%  20.5%  14.0% 
Assisted Delivery  35.1%  25.0%  26.1%  25.1%  26.5%  43.9%  16.3%  19.9% 
Child immunization  47.9%  33.5%  31.1%  39.4%  65.8%  33.6%  26.6%  29.3% 
Notes:   Medical help indicates access to medical professional in case of illness. Assisted delivery is calculated among mothers who received medical assistance 
in child birth. The indicator of child immunization indicates whether the child received all five immunizations. Panel A presents the probability of each 
indicator to be one predicted based on each type’s characteristics after estimation. Panel B is based on probabilities calculated based on the average 
characteristics across all types. The numbers in panel B presents the proportion of the sample indicating the outcome of the type of interest is better than those 
of others. 




Table 12.  
Selectivity Corrected Estimation of Log (Proportion of Health Expenditure) 








A.  Urban  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Age  0.045  0.095  0.044  0.042  -0.000  0.020  0.013  0.018 
Age Squared  -0.001  0.001  -0.000  0.001  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000 
Less than primary  -0.399  0.771  -0.266  0.642  -0.220  0.152  -0.057  0.184 
Primary  -0.564  0.539  0.483  0.590  -0.350**  0.143  -0.204  0.158 
Secondary +  -1.028**  0.492  0.391  0.671  -0.433**  0.196  -0.326  0.214 
Smoking/ qat chewing  -0.205  0.227  -0.401**  0.171  0.148  0.101  0.134  0.132 
Quintile2  -0.298  0.535  -0.119  0.495  -0.169  0.145  -0.425**  0.171 
Quintile3  -0.116  0.432  -0.049  0.485  -0.348**  0.136  -0.541***  0.161 
Quintile4  -0.160  0.426  0.124  0.496  -0.277**  0.121  -0.493***  0.152 
Quintile5  -0.586  0.403  -0.058  0.515  -0.412***  0.140  -0.669***  0.176 
Disabled member in the HH  0.098  0.188  0.296*  0.176  0.311***  0.094  0.247***  0.093 
    1.250**  0.610  -0.521  0.462  0.004  0.263  -0.030  0.171 
Constant  -0.010  1.997  -4.424***  1.430  -1.810***  0.407  -2.290***  0.366 
B.  Rural  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Age  -0.013  0.191  -0.099  0.074  -0.011  0.021  0.004  0.013 
Age Squared  0.001  0.003  0.001  0.001  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000 
Less than primary  1.368  0.805  -0.520  0.523  -0.193  0.125  -0.023  0.149 
Primary  0.895  0.864  -0.372  0.613  -0.289**  0.143  -0.067  0.178 
Secondary +  1.145  0.975  -0.172  0.764  -0.418**  0.223  -0.286  0.174 
Smoking/ qat chewing  -0.121  0.856  0.185  0.287  -0.276***  0.099  -0.060  0.123 
Quintile2  0.038  0.615  -0.313  0.432  -0.353***  0.110  -0.348***  0.121 
Quintile3  0.153  0.630  -0.524  0.405  -0.544***  0.122  -0.391***  0.126 
Quintile4  -1.302  0.681  -0.003  0.462  -0.423***  0.142  -0.301**  0.139 
Quintile5  -0.846  0.722  -0.280  0.484  -0.504***  0.158  -0.638***  0.219 
Disabled member in the HH  0.771  0.656  0.227  0.227  0.149*  0.089  0.311***  0.098 
    0.469  0.934  -0.283  0.452  -0.238  0.220  -0.290  0.257 
Constant  -2.985  4.204  -0.561  1.915  -1.301***  0.387  -2.392***  0.316 
Note:   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard Errors are obtained from bootstrapping. Omitted categories are “no education” and “Quintile 1.” The results of 
selection equation are not presented here. Governorate dummies are included in each estimation.  
 
 
Table 13.  
Informal Safety Net: The Impacts of Disabled Household Member 








A.  Urban  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Transfer income  0.037  0.065  0.031  0.033  0.060**  0.032  0.040**  0.020 
Borrowing  0.067***  0.023  0.093***  0.033  0.064**  0.032  0.128***  0.039 
B.  Rural  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Transfer income  -0.085  0.104  0.227***  0.031  0.059***  0.021  0.060**  0.026 
Borrowing  0.018     0.085      0.092***     0.030       0.116***     0.045  0.113***    0.029 
Notes: The coefficients of an indicator of disabled household member are obtained from two separate regressions on transfer income and borrowing separately for 
each region. 
 